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Abstract: The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is 12 
immeasurable. Aiming at the government's supervision of vaccine market, an evolutionary game 13 
model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic 14 
interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different 15 
supervision modes in vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that:  (1) Severe 16 
punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after 17 
investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent 18 
involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2)In the early stage of the game, the success rate of 19 
the government's efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously 20 
self-discipline; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government's supervision 21 
departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3)The success rate of government 22 
regulatory departments and the probability of third-party reporting play a great role in promoting 23 
the self-discipline of enterprises. (4)The power of government and regulation are conducive to 24 
promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but orruption of 25 
government and awareness of people are the different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine 26 
enterprises' non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive 27 
regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures 28 
according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent 29 
problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing 30 
the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers. 31 
Keywords: government regulation; defective vaccines; severe punishment; evolutionary game 32 
 33 
1. Introduction 34 
For more than two thousand years, human being has been searching for ways to fight all kinds 35 
of infectious diseases. Vaccine immunization is an economical and effective way to curb infectious 36 
diseases, and many diseases have been effectively controlled by vaccine immunization [1]. 37 
However, in recent years, “defective vaccines” incidents have emerged one after another in Anhui 38 
province, Jiangsu province, Dalian city, Hebei Province, Shanxi province, Shandong province, 39 
Changchun city, Wuhan city and other places in China, causing people’s panic about the safety of 40 
vaccines [2-4], and resulting in an unprecedented trust crisis for vaccine enterprises. When the 41 
shadow of the milk powder incident and the food safety incident has not been completely removed, 42 
“defective vaccines” incident will undoubtedly add insult to the injury. As the most economical and 43 
effectual medicines for the prevention and control of infectious diseases, vaccines are of great 44 
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strategic significance for individual health, social public health and social stability [5]. How to 45 
supervise vaccine enterprises more effectively has become the focus for all sectors of society [6]. 46 
Government regulation is the primary approach to solve vaccine safety problems [7].  47 
In recent years, many experts and scholars have studied vaccine regulatory events, regulatory 48 
approaches and regulatory models. Vaccine safety research is an important component of public 49 
health program [8-11]. Some scholars discussed the mutual restriction and interaction between the 50 
government and drug enterprises in the game process in order to find the reasons for the existence 51 
of unsafe drug incidents and put forward countermeasures [12]. Literature [13] and [14] discussed 52 
the game relationship between the government and production enterprises, local governments and 53 
social supervision, and then put forward corresponding countermeasures from the aspects of 54 
strengthening supervision, clarifying the relationship between regulatory departments and local 55 
governments, and promoting the application of new technologies. Literature [15-17] argued that the 56 
government should not only adopt severe punishment for drug safety supervision, but also 57 
improve government supervision technology, advocate diversified regulatory bodies, and pay 58 
attention to enterprise self-control and industry self-discipline. Literature [18], using the analytical 59 
method of regulation theory, believed that drug regulatory authorities should strengthen 60 
supervision of drug production process, increase punishment for violations, reduce the cost of 61 
quality regulation, and improve the accountability for malfeasance and irresponsibility. Some 62 
scholars mainly studied regulatory agencies, and found that the media and the public supervision 63 
were an effective complement to the government regulation. Literature [19-22] put forward that 64 
strengthening media supervision and penalties can raise the level of drug safety in China by 65 
analyzing the game relationship between the governments, drug regulatory department, and the 66 
social public.  67 
At present, scholars’ research on government regulation and vaccine quality and safety 68 
supervision is still insufficient. Firstly, with the development of society and the continuous 69 
awakening and improvement of public safety awareness, it is imperative for third-party regulatory 70 
agencies to participate in vaccine quality and safety supervision. The studies on third-party 71 
regulatory agencies participating in vaccine quality and safety have not received enough attention 72 
so far. Secondly, the government’s supervision of vaccine manufacturers pays more attention to the 73 
difference between active supervision and passive supervision instead of that between supervision 74 
and non-supervision before. Thirdly, in the existing game models, the government supervision 75 
department is regarded as a rational economic man who pursues the maximization of his own 76 
interests. This assumption is not consistent with the actual situation. In reality, the government 77 
supervision department aims at minimizing social losses. Therefore, under the assumption of 78 
bounded rationality of government supervisory authorities and vaccine manufacturers, this paper 79 
will analyze the equilibrium results by applying evolutionary game theory to vaccine quality and 80 
safety supervision. It is supposed to make the enterprise as self-disciplined as possible through the 81 
joint efforts of the government and the third party, and provides the basis for the government to 82 
formulate and improve various prevention policies and measures. 83 
There is a famous “broken window effect” in criminal psychology. If someone breaks the 84 
window glass of a building and the window is not repaired in a timely manner, others may be 85 
encouraged by some demonstration to break more windows [23-26]. Over time, these broken 86 
windows create a sense of disorder, and crime flourishes in an atmosphere of public indifference. 87 
“Defective vaccines" of vaccine manufacturers are like cracked windows. Once one enterprise 88 
manufactures “defective vaccines" based on its own interests, if the government or the public fails 89 
to supervise and find out, other enterprises will follow suit and eventually cause “defective 90 
vaccines” to flourish. Vaccine regulation is a typical non-cooperative game problem. As an 91 
autonomous economic entity, the choice of vaccine enterprises seems rational on the surface, but it 92 
may not be reasonable from the perspective of the whole society. The addition of external 93 
intervention mechanism will effectively promote the system to achieve the optimal solution. 94 
Therefore, participation, coordination and guidance of the government and the public are essential 95 
in solving the problem of vaccine regulation. Evolutionary game theory is a method that combines 96 
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game and dynamic evolution, which can study the stable structure of the game system and the 97 
process of strategy selection of behavior subjects in the evolutionary process by introducing 98 
dynamic mechanism [27-30]. The basic idea is the case that in a group of a certain size, game players 99 
are not super rational players, and it is difficult to find the optimal equilibrium point in a single 100 
game, but multiple execution of the game can identify an equilibrium through trial and correction. 101 
Thus, the best strategy for game players is to imitate and improve their previous strategies. 102 
Through long-term imitation and improvement, all game players will tend to reach a definite stable 103 
strategy [31-36]. 104 
Under the mode of government supervision, there are many factors affecting the behavior of 105 
drug (food) enterprises, and many scholars have given different opinions. These research results 106 
focus on the impact of external and internal factors on their decision-making. This paper searches 107 
the fields of "drug regulation" and "food regulation" from Google academic and China HowNet, 108 
and the relevant summary is shown in Table 1: 109 
Table 1. Influencing factors of drug (food) enterprise behavior decision under government 110 
supervision mode. 111 
Scholars (Year) Influencing factors 
Song Yan (2009)[37] Income from qualified drugs and fake drugs 
Cao Jiantao 
(2018)[13] 
additional benefit, benefit of inaction, positive utility, cost of 
implementation, government punishment 
Song Yan (2016)[15] benefits of qualified drugs, safety costs, benefits of fake and inferior 
drugs, accident handling costs, government fines 
Fang Yu (2010)[16] regulatory probability, regulatory cost, safety accident probability, 
violation cost, disposal cost, discount factor, social loss, penalty 
amount 
Yan Jianzhou 
(2015) [18] 
regulatory cost, safety cost, penalty, legal liability cost, social cost, 
reputation loss 
Liu Sukun 
(2011)[38] 
regulatory costs, normal earnings, excess earnings, penalties 
Liu Sukun 
(2012)[39] 
supervision cost, reputation loss, degree of supervision, illegal 
earnings, punishment, enterprise earnings, probability of illegal 
operation, probability of legal operation, probability of public report 
and verification of earnings 
Jiang Shubo
（2009）[40] 
control cost, penalty amount, compensation amount, regulatory 
probability, disguised cost, income from superior goods, income 
from inferior goods, excess income 
Zhao, L(2018) [41] government regulations, product output, product revenue, 
regulatory cost 
According to the research results in recent years, it can be seen that the cost of government 112 
supervision, social benefits, benefits of drug (food) enterprises, penalties for non-cooperation, 113 
probability of public or third-party supervision are the core factors that affect the behavioral 114 
decisions of drug (food) enterprises. Therefore, based on the existing research costs, this paper took 115 
these factors as the main parameters to construct the evolutionary game model for behavioral 116 
decisions of vaccine manufacturers under different government regulatory modes. 117 
The main problems to be solved in this paper are as follows: 118 
(1) This paper analyzes the competition and cooperation relationship and game strategy of the 119 
behavior decision-making of vaccine enterprises under the supervision of the government, and 120 
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considers the third-party supervision as an environmental factor. Combined with the analysis of 121 
variables, it discusses the conditions that affect the evolution of the interaction between vaccine 122 
manufacturers and the government towards the direction of cooperation; 123 
 (2) Based on the premise of bounded rationality, the decision-making process of vaccine 124 
manufacturing enterprises is regarded as a dynamic process of gradual learning. The evolutionary 125 
game model of government and vaccine manufacturing enterprises is constructed. The key factors 126 
affecting the game strategy of both sides are found by solving the model; 127 
(3) By analyzing the equilibrium point and stability of the evolutionary game between the 128 
government and vaccine manufacturers, the choice of the stable strategy of the two is studied. Then, 129 
through the changes of government punishment, third-party report and other parameters, using 130 
MATLAB simulation analysis, the evolution trend of the game of the behavior decision-making of 131 
vaccine enterprises is investigated under different government supervision modes, and reasonable 132 
countermeasures and suggestions are put forwarded to provide decision-making basis for 133 
government departments. 134 
2. Methods 135 
2.1. Model assumptions 136 
Hypothesis 1: Under different regulatory models, the game process between vaccine 137 
manufacturers and the government is also dynamic, and the strategies of both sides of the game can 138 
be adjusted at any time before reaching the evolutionary game equilibrium. 139 
Hypothesis 2: Bribery and rent-seeking behaviors between government departments and 140 
vaccine manufacturers do not exist. 141 
Hypothesis 3: In order to avoid the risk of penalities and ensure the maximization of benefits, 142 
the vaccine manufacturer will adopt the self-disciplined behavior to produce qualified vaccine with 143 
a certain probability x , so the probability of non-self-disciplined behavior is 1 x . Due to the 144 
regulatory costs of the government, the supervision of vaccine manufacturers can only take a 145 
certain probability to be carried out in active supervision strategy, and the probability of passive 146 
supervision strategy is1 y . 147 
2.2. Model symbol description 148 
In this paper, the profit and loss variables between government regulatory authorities and 149 
vaccine manufacturers are set as follows: 150 
 151 
The government regulatory authorities need to invest certain human, material and financial 152 
resources in the active supervision of vaccine production enterprises. This investment is affected by 153 
government power and regulations, and the resulting cost of active supervision is 1G
C

 (  is the 154 
strict coefficient of government rights and regulations). Relevant research shows that the more strict 155 
the government's rights and regulations are, the lower the regulatory cost will be. 
2GC

 is the cost 156 
of passive supervision of government departments, which is related to the government's corruption 157 
of government and awareness of people. Relevant research shows that the stronger the corruption 158 
of government and awareness of people, the lower the cost of passive supervision of the 159 
government.The difference between operational supervision and passive regulation lies in the fact 160 
that passive supervision refers to the supervision conducted after the report from the third party 161 
regulatory agency or the public is received. Therefore, the cost of government passive regulation is 162 
much higher than that of the active supervision cost, namely, 
2 1 0G G
C C
 
  . 163 
At the same time, active supervision will reduce non-self-disciplined behaviors of vaccine 164 
enterprises, which can be restrained from the source and effectively decrease social losses. Passive 165 
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supervision is a type of behavior regulation after the vaccine manufacturers choose 166 
non-self-discipline strategy, which usually causes some losses to the society. In the case of active 167 
supervision by government supervision departments, the success rate of their supervision is 168 
expressed by  ( 0 1  ). In the case of passive supervision by corresponding government 169 
departments, the success rate is expressed by   ( 0 1  ), and 0 1    .  170 
Assume that   is the probability of being reported by the third party if the enterprise is not 171 
self-disciplined. The benefits obtained by vaccine production enterprises from the self-discipline 172 
and non-self-discipline strategy are 1VR  and 2VR respectively, where 2 1V VR R . If the enterprise is 173 
not self-disciplined, the enterprise will suffer the penalty and reputation loss 1VF . Assume the 174 
penalty coefficient 
1
2
V
V
F
R
   , and 1  . If the enterprise produces unqualified products and the 175 
profit is higher than the possible penalty, then the government supervision is meaningless. Assume176 
2VF  is the rectification cost to be paid by the vaccine manufacturer after the non-self-disciplined 177 
behavior is detected and the disposal cost to eliminate the adverse impact on the society, VC  is the 178 
inspection cost of the vaccine manufacturers for cooperating with government supervision, and if 179 
the non-self-discipline of the vaccine manufacturer is discovered by the regulatory authorities, the 180 
government regulatory authorities will gain the benefits GR . 181 
The game payoff matrix of the two players is given in Table 2. 182 
Table 2.  Game payoff matrix. 183 
 
Government regulatory authority 
Active regulation（ y ） Passive regulation（1 y ） 
vaccine 
manufac
turers  
Self-discipline（ x ） 1V VR C , 1G
C

  1 1( ) (1 )V V VR C R    ， 2( )G
C


  
non-self-discipline
（1 x ） 
2 1 2(1 ) ( )V V V VR F F C    
， 1GG
C
R

  
2 1 2 2[(1 ) ( ) ] (1 )V V V V VR F F C R        
， 2 2[ ( ) (1 )( )]G GG
C C
R  
 
    ） 
3. Results 184 
3.1. Duplicate dynamic equation construction 185 
According to Malthusian equation, the expected benefits of vaccine manufacturers for 186 
self-discipline strategy 
1
1E  and non-self-discipline strategy
2
1E , and the average benefits 1E are as 
187 
follows. 188 
])1()()[1()( 111
1
1 VVVVV RCRyCRyE                                   (1) 
189 
2
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
[(1 ) ( ) ] (1 ){ [(1 ) ( ) ] (1 ) }
V V V V V V V V V
E y R F F C y R F F C R                  (2) 190 
2
1
1
11 )1( ExxEE                                                          (3) 
191 
The replication dynamic equation selected by vaccine manufacturers is as follows. 192 
1
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ){ [( )( )] ( )}V V V V V V V V
dx
F x x E E x x y R F F R R R F F
dt
              193 
  (4) 194 
Similarly, the
1
2E ,
2
2E  and 2E of government regulatory departments are as follows:  
195 
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1 1 1
2 ( ) (1 )( )
G G
G
C C
E x x R
 
                                                 (5) 196 
2 2 2 2
2 ( ) (1 ){ [ ( ) (1 )( )]}
G G G
G
C C C
E x x R   
  
                                 (6) 197 
1 2
2 2 2(1 )E yE y E                                                          (7) 
198 
Therefore, the replication dynamic equation of active supervision chosen by government 199 
regulatory departments is as follows. 200 
1 2 1
2 2( ) ( ) (1 )[( ) (1 ) ]
G G
G
C Cdy
G y y E E y y R x
dt

 
 
                        (8) 201 
Equation (4) and equation (8) constitute a two-dimensional dynamic system (I). 202 
3.2. Stability analysis of equilibrium point 203 
Proposition 1 For the two-dimensional dynamic system (I), there must be 22 4  pure 204 
strategy equilibrium points, that is (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0) respectively. At the same time, there 205 
may be an equilibrium point of a mixed strategy 
* *( , )x y , and there is * [0,1]x  , * [0,1]y  . 206 
* 2 11
( )
G G
G
C C
x M
R
 
  

  

,
*
2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2
( )( )
( )
V V V
V V V V Vy N
R F F
R R R F F
 

 
  
   
 207 
Proof: For the above two dimensional dynamical system, when 0x  , 1x  , 0y   or 208 
1y  , there is ( ) 0, ( ) 0F x G y  . Therefore, (1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0) are the equilibrium points of 209 
the system. When 0 1x  , 0 1y  , if 210 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 0[( )( )] ( )V V V V V V V Vy R F F R R R F F           , and 211 
2 1( ) (1 ) 0G G GR x C C         , then there is ( ) 0, ( ) 0F x G y  . The possible 212 
equilibrium point of the two-dimensional dynamic system (I) ( , )x y   can be gotten by solving 213 
the equations (9), which is shown as follows. 214 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1
[( )( )] ( ) 0
( ) (1 ) 0
V V V V V V V V
G G G
R F F R R R F F
R x C C
y   
    
        

    
       (9)  215 
According to Friedman (1998) [28], the equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategy 216 
(ESS for short) after the stability test, that is, the stability of the equilibrium can be judged by local 217 
stability of Jaconbian matrix.  218 
The Jacobian matrix of the system is: 219 
11 12
21 22
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
G x G x
a ax y
J
a aF y F y
x y
  
    
    
    
   
 220 
where 221 
11 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2(1 2 ){ [( )( )] ( )}V V V V V V V Va x R F F R R R F Fy               222 
12 2 1 2(1 )( )( )V V Va x x R F F        223 
21 (1 ) ( ) Ga y y R      224 
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22 2 1(1 2 )[ ( ) (1 ) ]G G Ga y R x C C           
225 
If both of the following conditions are satisfied, the equilibrium point of the replicated 226 
dynamic equation is the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS). 227 
(1) 11 22 0trJ a a    (trace condition)； 
228 
(2) 
11 12
11 22 12 21
21 22
det 0
a a
J a a a a
a a
    ( Jacobian condition) 229 
From the above calculated data, it can be seen that 11 22 0a a  , and there are non-trace 
230 
conditions at the local equilibrium point ( , )M N ,  so the equilibrium point is definitely not the 231 
evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system. The remaining four equilibrium points are 232 
discussed below. Depending on the values of the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix, the 233 
local stability of the equilibrium points can be determined. The results are shown in Table 3: 234 
Table 3. Determinant values and trace of local equilibrium points. 235 
Local 
equilibrium 
points 
11a  12a  21a  22a  
(0,0)  1 2 2 1 2( )V V V V VR R R F F     0 0 
2 1( ) G G GR C C      
 
(0,1)  1 2 2 1 2( )V V V V VR R R F F     0 0 
2 1[( ) ]G G GR C C      
 
(1,0)  1 2 2 1 2[ ( )]V V V V VR R R F F      0 0 2 1G GC C   
(1,1)  1 2 2 1 2[ ]( )V V V V VR R R F F      0 0 2 1( )G GC C    
* *
( , )x y  0 M N 0 
Proposition 2 Assume that 
2 1
2 1 2
V V
V V V
R R
R F F



 
 is the ratio of profit to loss of vaccine 236 
manufacturers for their non-self-discipline strategies, where 2 1V VR R  is the excess return, and 
237 
2 1 2V V VR F F   is the loss of vaccine manufacturers for their non-self-discipline. Therefore, from 
238 
the perspective of economics, it can be regarded that   is the ratio of profit to loss for their 239 
non-self-discipline strategies. 240 
(1) When 0     or 0      , that is, when the ratio of benefit to loss of the 241 
vaccine manufacturers for their non-self-discipline is between the probabilities of success of two 242 
different regulatory approaches, it is a transition period of the game between the two sides, the 243 
two-dimensional dynamic system (I) has no ESS, and its evolutionary path is a closed circle of 244 
infinite cycles (as shown in Figure 1a). 245 
(2) If 0     and 2 10 G GC C   , that is, the profit loss ratio of 246 
non-self-discipline behavior strategy of vaccine manufacturers is greater than the probability of 247 
success of the two different regulatory approaches. Vaccine manufacturers will eventually choose 248 
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non-self-discipline. When conducting active supervision, government regulatory departments need 249 
to invest more human resources for supervision and more financial resources to develop and 250 
purchase high-end technologies and equipment. Therefore, the cost of passive supervision is less 251 
than that of active supervision. At this point, the behavioral strategy of two players is 252 
(non-self-discipline, passive supervision), then (0,0) is an ESS of the two-dimensional dynamic 253 
system (I), and its evolutionary path is shown in Figure 1b. Similarly, when 0       and 254 
2 10 G GC C   , the behavioral strategy of two players is (self-discipline, passive supervision), 
255 
then (1,0) is an ESS of the two-dimensional dynamic system (I), and its evolutionary path is shown 256 
in Figure 1c. 257 
(3) If 0      and 1 20 G GC C   , that is, the profit loss ratio of 258 
non-self-discipline behavior strategy of vaccine manufacturers is greater than the probability of 259 
success of the two different regulatory approaches. The government supervision department 260 
chooses active supervision strategy according to the principle of interests maximization, that is, the 261 
benefits gotten by the government regulators are greater than the gains from passive regulation. 262 
The behavioral strategy of two players is (non-self-discipline, active supervision), then (0,1) is an 263 
ESS of the two-dimensional dynamic system (I), and its evolutionary path is shown in Figure 1d. 264 
Similarly, when 0        and 1 20 G GC C    , the behavioral strategy of two 265 
players is (self-discipline, active supervision), then (1,1) is an ESS of the two-dimensional dynamic 266 
system (I), and its evolutionary path is shown in Figure 1e. 267 
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Figure 1d                               Figure 1e 273 
It is shown that the local stability can be determined by the determinant and trace values of the 274 
Jacobian matrix of the two-dimensional dynamical system (I).  275 
Depending on the above analysis, the two-dimensional dynamic system (I) in the case (2) and 276 
(3) in proposition 2 has corresponding evolutionary stability strategy. In particular, when 277 
0      or 0      , the two-dimensional dynamical system (I) has no 278 
corresponding evolutionary stability strategy. According to the local stability analysis method of 279 
the Jacobian matrix, the stability analysis of its equilibrium point is carried out. The results are 280 
shown in Table 4. 281 
Table 4. Stability analysis equilibrium points when 0     or 0      . 282 
Local 
equilibriu
m points 
det J  trJ  Results 
(0,0)  － uncertain Saddle point 
(0,1)  － uncertain Saddle point 
(1,0)  － uncertain Saddle point 
(1,1)  － uncertain Saddle point 
* *
( , )x y  + 0 Center point 
Under the above assumptions, the evolutionary game model has four saddle points and a 283 
central point, which are (1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0), and284 
2 1
2 1 2
1 2 2 1 21 ,
( ) ( )( )
( )
G G
G V V V
V V V V VC C
R R F F
R R R F F 
    
 
 
    
   
. 285 
According to the solution of the model, the characteristic roots corresponding to the point 286 
* *
( , )x y  are a pair of pure virtual roots. Based on the research of Taylor [42, 43], they are stable 287 
equilibrium points of the system, but not asymptotically stable points. The evolution trajectory of 288 
the system is a closed-loop curve around the equilibrium point
* *
( , )x y . That is to say, when289 
0     , or when 0      , the behavioral strategy choice of vaccine manufacturers 290 
and government regulators is to keep changing around the equilibrium point
* *
( , )x y , the system 291 
will not automatically stabilize to the equilibrium point. Therefore, the equilibrium point 
* *
( , )x y is 292 
not the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the two-dimensional dynamic system (I). 293 
Proposition 3 When the profit-loss ratio of the non-self-disciplined behavior strategy of the 294 
vaccine manufacturer and the probability of success of the two different regulatory approaches 295 
meet the conditions 0      or 0      , the convergence of the system depends 296 
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on the values of other parameters. According to the replication dynamic equation of the 297 
two-dimensional dynamic system (I) and the evolution phase diagram of figure 1a, it can be seen 298 
that when the value of other parameters is fixed, the lower the proportion of self-discipline of 299 
vaccine manufacturers is, the more likely government regulatory authorities are to choose the 300 
behavioral strategy of active supervision. Similarly, the higher the proportion of active supervision 301 
by government regulatory departments, the more likely vaccine manufacturers are to choose the 302 
self-discipline strategy. 303 
Proof: The two-dimensional dynamical system (I) of the duplicate dynamic equation is as 304 
follows.  305 
1
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ){ [( )( )] ( )}V V V V V V V V
dx
F x x E E x x y R F F R R R F F
dt
              306 
1 2 1
2 2( ) ( ) (1 )[( ) (1 ) ]
G G
G
C Cdy
G y y E E y y R x
dt

 
 
          307 
It can be known that, when
2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2
( )( )
( )
V V V
V V V V V
R F F
R R R F F
y
 

  
   
 , there is 
1
0
( )
x
dF x
dx 
 , 308 
and 1x   is the evolutionary stability strategy ESS. When
2 11
( )
G G
G
C C
x
R
 
  

 

, there is 309 
1
0
( )
x
dG y
dy

 , and 1y   is the evolutionary stable strategy ESS. Therefore, the lower the 310 
proportion of self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers is, the higher the proportion of active 311 
supervision of government regulatory departments x  will be, and vice versa. 312 
4. Discussion 313 
The optimal decision of the two sides is obtained through the establishment of the game model 314 
between the government regulatory department and the vaccine manufacturer. In view of the fact 315 
that although the government continuously strengthens the supervision of vaccine manufacturers, 316 
the non-self-discipline of vaccines occurs from time to time, it is of no practical significance to 317 
discuss the high incidence period of non-self-discipline and the period of enterprise self-discipline. 318 
In this context, based on the above analysis and the results, the influence of parameter changes on 319 
the strategic choice of both sides is discussed through analyzing the severity of undisciplined 320 
punishment, government active regulation and government passive regulation. By setting relevant 321 
parameters, MATLAB R2017b software was used for the simulation to more clearly reflect the 322 
influence of parameter changes on the evolution direction of both sides. The initial value setting is 323 
shown in Table 5: 324 
Table 5. Parameter initial value setting. 325 
Parameter  1GC  2GC  GR        1VR  2VR  1VF  2VF  VC    
 
Value  1 5 3 0.3 0.8 0.4 2 6 4 2 1 1 1 
Matlab simulation was conducted based on the above parameter assumptions, and the results 326 
are shown in Figure 2. With the increase in the number of iterative steps in the simulation evolution, 327 
the evolutionary stable point of the game behavior between the government regulatory department 328 
and the vaccine manufacturer is (0, 0). 329 
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Figure 2. Initial state of government regulatory departments and vaccine manufacturers.  (1) The 331 
impact of government punishment on the evolutionary behavior of vaccine companies. 332 
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Figure 3. Cooperative probability simulation results of vaccine enterprises under government 334 
punishment. 335 
According to the definition of profit-loss ratio
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FFR
RR
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1
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VF

, then the simulation result is inversely proportional to the simulation result  . 337 
According to the evolution results in figure 3, when the punishment of non-self-discipline 338 
enterprises by government departments increases continuously, the probability of enterprises 339 
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temptation of undisciplined behaviors  is greatly reduced. When   is smaller than both the 347 
probability of active regulation and the probability of passive regulation, vaccine manufacturers 348 
will enter a period of self-discipline based on their own comprehensive consideration. In the same 349 
way, the cost of the rectification after the investigation and punishment of the non-self-discipline of 350 
vaccine manufacturers can also lead to the same conclusion as that of the government punishment, 351 
which will not be repeated. When enterprises are found out to be non-self-discipline, the 352 
government should strictly require enterprises to rectify, raise the rectification requirements, and 353 
increase the cost of rectification, so that vaccine manufacturers avoid choosing non-self-discipline 354 
strategy. 355 
 (2) The impact of active regulation by government regulatory departments on the evolution of 356 
the two parties 357 
Depending on the simulation Figure 4, when the government regulatory active supervision 358 
rate is increasing, the vaccine production enterprise tends to choose self-discipline, and government 359 
regulators are inclined to choose passive regulation. If the government can ensure efficient 360 
regulatory success rate, the vaccine production enterprise will go constantly in the direction of 361 
self-discipline. At the same time, as the vaccine production enterprise gradually regulate their own 362 
behavior, the probability of non-self-discipline behavior appears to be smaller and smaller, and the 363 
loss of the society suffering tends to be smaller as well. If the active regulation effect is not obvious, 364 
government regulators are likely to choose passive regulation with a relatively stable state, for the 365 
reason that at this time the government supervision cost and the effect of passive regulation are 366 
more favorable than that of active supervision.  367 
 368 
Figure 4. Simulation results of the evolutionary game between the two parties under the 369 
condition that the success rate of government’s active supervision is increased 370 
 (3) The influence of passive government regulation and third-party reporting probability on 371 
the evolution of both parties 372 
Depending on the simulation in Figure 5 and Figure 6, with the increase of the probability of 373 
passive regulation and reports from the third party, the non-self-disciplined behavior of the vaccine 374 
production enterprises is more likely to be exposed, which is a great threat to the enterprise. In the 375 
case of severe punishment by the government regulatory authorities, the possibility of investigation 376 
and punishment faced by enterprises is also increasing, which will make enterprises face high cost 377 
of punishment, and ultimately vaccine manufacturers choose self-discipline behavior.. With the 378 
increase in the success rate of passive regulation and the report of the third party, governments 379 
tend to adopt passive regulation strategy. In line with the principle of the minimum loss to society, 380 
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the government supervision department should take the initiative and increase the success rate of 381 
functional regulation to minimize non-self-discipline choices of the vaccine production enterprises 382 
and avoid damage to the society. 383 
 384 
Figure 5. Simulation results of the evolutionary game between the two parties under the 385 
circumstance that the success rate of government passive supervision is increased. 386 
 387 
Figure 6. Simulation results of the evolutionary game between the two parties under the condition 388 
that the probability of third-party reporting is improved. 389 
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Figure 7. Simulation results of the evolutionary game between the two parties under the condition 392 
that power of the government and regulation is improved. 393 
Depending on the simulation in Figure 7 when the power of government is greater and the 394 
regulations are stricter, the regulatory cost of the government's regulatory authorities will be 395 
reduced due to the deterrence of vaccine manufacturers to the government's power and regulations. 396 
At this time, the government will choose to take the initiative due to the lower cost of active 397 
regulation. At this time, due to the strict government power and laws and regulations, vaccine 398 
enterprises will increase the penalty and reputation loss when they do not self-discipline. At this 399 
time, in order to avoid greater loss, vaccine enterprises will take the principle of maximizing their 400 
own interests, and finally turn from non self-discipline behavior strategy selection to self-discipline 401 
behavior. Therefore, greater government power and strict laws and regulations are conducive to 402 
promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities and the cooperative 403 
behavior of vaccine enterprises. 404 
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Figure 8. Simulation results of the evolutionary game between the two parties under the condition 408 
that corruption of government and awareness of people is improved. 409 
Depending on the simulation in Figure 7 that the larger the coefficient of corruption of 410 
government and awareness of people, the lower the cost of passive supervision of the government 411 
regulatory department, and it will also tend to avoid the cost and choose passive supervision. 412 
Because the opportunity cost of the government's active supervision is higher, the final choice is 413 
passive supervision. However, due to the high level of corruption of government and awareness of 414 
people, vaccine enterprises will increase the probability of third-party reporting, which will 415 
increase the cost of non self-discipline, and finally choose self-discipline strategy. Therefore, 416 
corruption of government and awareness of people are also conducive to promoting the passive 417 
supervision of government regulatory departments and the cooperative behavior of vaccine 418 
enterprises. 419 
5. Conclusions 420 
According to the above analysis, the main conclusions can be drawn: (1) Severe punishment by 421 
government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and 422 
handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary 423 
behaviors of vaccine enterprises (2)In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the 424 
government's efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-discipline; 425 
when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government's supervision departments tend to be 426 
more conducive to passive supervision. (3)The success rate of government regulatory departments 427 
and the probability of third-party reporting play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of 428 
enterprises. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises' non-discipline increases, the government 429 
regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. (4)The power of government 430 
and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory 431 
authorities but orruption of government and awareness of people are the different. 432 
Built on the above conclusions, the following policy suggestions are proposed for the 433 
government to guide and supervise the vaccine manufacturers to take self-discipline actions.  434 
(1) Raising public awareness of public safety 435 
Make full use of the publicity advantages of new media platforms, strengthen the publicity 436 
and education of vaccine safety knowledge, and improve public safety awareness. Specifically, 437 
continuously strengthen the team construction of the vaccine regulators and use new media 438 
software through various channels to improve the public’s ability to identify fake and substandard 439 
vaccine; strengthen public awareness and safeguard their legitimate rights and interests of 440 
consumers to report complaints of their own, so as to establish the corresponding reporting 441 
incentives; and actively guide the public to participate in supervision, and to encourage and 442 
support in the vaccine production line staff disclosure of the vaccine quality safety problems timely. 443 
(2) Severe punishment 444 
Heavy penalties for non-self-discipline vaccine production enterprises should be enforced 445 
according to specific situations. For a large-scale vaccine production enterprise, two hundred 446 
million RMB is nothing significant, while it is too much to bear for a small-scale vaccine production 447 
enterprise. Therefore, one of the principles that must be adhered to is to hit the “pain point” of the 448 
non-self-discipline vaccine manufacturers. Severe punishment will be meted out to the vaccine 449 
manufacturers that refuse to change.  450 
(3) Improving government supervision 451 
Government supervision includes active supervision and passive supervision. Active 452 
supervision requires the government to continuously increase capital investment in vaccine safety 453 
supervision, and urges food and drug safety supervision departments in various regions to conduct 454 
regular and irregular inspections on local vaccine manufacturers with high frequency and intensity. 455 
Passive supervision is mainly the third party supervision agencies and public supervision. The 456 
involvement of third party regulatory agencies is a change from the traditional government 457 
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regulatory model. With the introduction of the third party regulatory agency, vaccine regulation is 458 
linked with “Internet plus”. Through the use of various information technologies, the vaccine safety 459 
supervision information platform can monitor vaccine manufacturers in real time, increase the 460 
depth and breadth of supervision, and realize the traceability of vaccines in various circulation links, 461 
which can effectively improve the supervision efficiency. Public supervision is an important part of 462 
vaccine safety supervision. When the government is in a state of passive supervision for various 463 
reasons, public supervision can effectively improve the success rate of the government’s passive 464 
supervision. Although the cost of government’s passive supervision is higher than that of active 465 
supervision, timely loss control is another way of self-protection. Public supervision is an effective 466 
supplement to government supervision. Multiple forms of supervision coexist to achieve multiple 467 
co-governance. 468 
In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game of behavior decision-making of vaccine 469 
enterprises under the supervision of the government, and analyze the interaction of behavior 470 
between the players. However, we have focused on the situation where there are only two 471 
strategies for the players. In the future research, we will consider the evolutionary game involving 472 
multi players and multi strategies, and the impact of government policies and strategies on the 473 
behavior decision-making of heterogeneous vaccine enterprises. 474 
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